When a system crashes, fast and accurate log-based fault diagnosis can remarkably reduce the recovery time of the system and avoid further economic losses. Especially for the nuclear power industry, recovery time will lead not only to economic losses but also to international repercussions. Nevertheless, the massive quantity of obscure log information and the existence of hidden nodes pose major challenges to fault diagnosis and root cause determination. To overcome these obstacles, we propose the nowhere to hide (NTH) methodology, an efficient method to diagnose faults and locate root causes. We implement log-node and node-log mapping to avoid vital data loss in collecting fault logs and hidden nodes; furthermore, we utilize the logic of the nuclear power unit process system to reveal the crucial information in fault logs and hidden nodes and their causality to determine the root cause. We evaluate the methodology in a real nuclear industrial environment. The results show that system administrators can efficiently determine the root cause with the proposed methodology. Finally, we discuss the enhancements that are underway to improve the methodology.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the widespread application of large-scale nuclear industrial distributed control systems (DCSs) in the nuclear industry, the interactions between various process systems and components have become increasingly frequent. Thus, the typical characteristics of a DCS of a nuclear power unit are difficult to understand. Usually, the system records a series of log information at run time according to preset rules, including normal execution records and failure information. For nuclear power units, DCS logs are very important resources for diagnosing the faults of components and process systems.
When a shutdown or power reduction event occurs in a nuclear power plant, the administrators must fix the fault and restore normal and stable operation of the nuclear power The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Shichao Liu . unit as soon as possible. Generally, the administrators will analyze the DCS logs manually to identify the fault. However, the massive quantity of obscure log information generated in real time and the complex content pose a major challenge to manual analysis method. The response time of the nuclear power unit recovery will be seriously delayed by the existing noisy logs produced by noisy faults and normal component actions. Through manual analysis, it is very difficult to extract valuable information from the logs efficiently, locate the fault accurately and fix the fault quickly, which will cause substantial economic losses and even international repercussions. For instance, the catastrophe at Japan's Fukushima nuclear power plant in 2011 is still remembered worldwide. Therefore, we propose the nowhere to hide (NTH) methodology, which can assist nuclear power unit administrators in identifying the fault log sequence, locating the fault, and determining the root cause of the fault efficiently.
The event log has been extensively used for characterizing software faults for decades [1] . Many studies on fault analysis based on system logs have been proposed by experts in the field, focusing mainly on the following aspects. Log analysis and gathering [2] is the first aspect, which aims to acquire meaningful log information effectively and efficiently by filtering noisy log information. The meaningful log information is then used to obtain precise information for system state analysis [3] and feature extraction [4] . The second aspect is fault location, which investigates how to discover the execution process of software via log analysis [5] and to locate the positions of faults [6] . Log fault analysis has been used by the abovementioned studies under different circumstances. However, no study has investigated how to design an integrated fault diagnosis methodology for nuclear industrial DCS that fully considers the needs of system administrators. The last aspect lies in fault correlation analysis. For fault diagnosis, fault propagation is a critical problem in multinode systems, especially for large nuclear industrial DCS. Fault propagation focuses on discovering the relationship between different faults by analyzing the log information. Temporal and spatial correlations and the meanings of logs [7] have been used by some researchers to investigate this relationship, but few have considered combining this information with the logic correlation of the process systems and the components. Additionally, although the probability of errors has been significantly reduced, the precision is not sufficient to diagnose the faults of a nuclear industrial DCS.
A clustering-filtering-refinement method [1] was proposed to perform anomaly detection, and two new distance-based features were designed to measure the anomaly degree. However, this method was incapable of inferring the causality of system logs, and our methodology aims to reveal the causality of fault logs and the root cause. A similarity-based error log filtering method (SBF) was designed to filter out noisy error logs with fine granularity while retaining suspicious event logs likely related to the insert fault [27] . However, this method requires re-execution of the fault, which is impossible in the nuclear power industry.
Sherlog [4] proposed to obtain the detailed process of errors that occurred to help engineers diagnose errors, similar to NTH. However, the method assumes that the log is generated on a single machine and is hence not suitable for distributed systems. Xu et al. [6] , [20] proposed a log-based methodology to detect problems without any prior knowledge from operators as input or any system instrumentation that is incapable of understanding the meaning of logs generated from the nuclear power industry. Sherlog [4] , Elas-ticSearch [28] , SmartLog [31] , Statechart Workbench [32] and other methods [6] , [20] , [26] have been designed for fault diagnosis and troubleshooting; however, the above tools and approaches make a common assumption that the source code of the system is available. For intellectual property and commercial reasons, nuclear power system vendors do not provide the source code; therefore, our NTH methodology requires no source code.
Many tools and systems have been proposed to track causality and moderate the burden of testing distributed systems [40] , [41] , [42] , [43] . However, these approaches are incapable of analyzing the logs generated from multiple log sources. Falcon [29] was designed to coherently relate the data from various log files in a causality relationship, but the method assumes that the event information can be captured by a network sniffer. Hence, the approach is not suitable for large industrial distributed systems, which usually have hidden nodes for which the corresponding information cannot be captured. NTH can solve the above problem by analyzing the logs from various log sources and discovering hidden nodes in the process.
Many advantages can be achieved if a fault log analysis system can help in analyzing log information, which will reduce the time to locate the fault and repair the system [8] . Therefore, we propose the NTH methodology to collect and analyze logs generated by nuclear industrial process systems and components. NTH leverages the log-node and nodelog mapping technique and fault logic correlation analysis to discover the causal relationships of fault logs and locate the root cause of faults. With the assistance of the proposed methodology, system administrators can locate the fault process system or component efficiently and then determine the root cause of the faults.
The NTH methodology consists of four modules: 1) the log collection module, which collects log data from various process systems and components, 2) the fault log analysis module, which aims to identify logs for fault diagnosis, 3) the fault log correlation analysis module, which collects fault logs caused by the same root fault as a tuple and attempts to find the root cause of those faults, and 4) the database, which provides storage of log information, topological graph and logic of the nuclear power unit process system. NTH has been deployed in a practical nuclear industrial system to assist the system administrator in locating faults and finding the root cause of faults. Our main contributions are as follows:
1) We propose a novel method for clustering fault logs and hidden nodes utilizing the log-node and node-log mapping to avoid vital data loss by providing considerable information.
2) To the best of our knowledge, leveraging the logic knowledge of industrial process systems to detect HTNs, which is extremely crucial to determining root causes in the nuclear power industry, is proposed for the first time.
3) In addition, this methodology can help to improve the stability and reliability of a nuclear power unit by implementing evolution in the following aspects: 1) the number of key logs with low severity will be increased, 2) the HTN will be detectable by adding detectors, and 3) forewarning logs may be added before crucial logs to remind the administrator. 4) This paper illustrates the NTH methodology, which can help administrators of nuclear power units to analyze the hidden nodes and logs generated by all the detectable process systems and components, diagnose faults quickly and determine root causes accurately after shutdown and power reduction events occur.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the background of log analysis and related work. Section 3 outlines the proposed structure and describes the implementation of the NTH methodology. Section 4 describes the evaluation of our methodology. Threats to validity are presented in Section 5, and Section 6 presents our conclusions and future work.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK A. BACKGROUND
In a nuclear power unit, when a shutdown or power reduction event occurs, the massive amounts of obscure log information with complex content generated in real time and the objective existence of hidden nodes pose major challenges to the extraction of valuable information from the logs and location of the fault.
The main purpose of log gathering is to acquire meaningful information. Previous techniques are based mainly on regular expressions [9] and semantics. However, for different types of systems, especially large industrial distributed systems, due to the variety of complicated knowledge of different domains [10] , it is extremely difficult to establish regular expressions [24] and understand complex semantics. A log visualization system, Tudumi [11] , was proposed to monitor and audit computer logs to make it easier for administrators to understand log information. However, Tudumi visualizes only a single aspect of computer activity without filtering any log information; thus, it is an inappropriate choice for large complicated distributed systems.
Log classification plays an important role in log-based analysis systems. Many famous algorithms have been proposed to cluster data, such as NBM, HMMS [12] , CURE [13] , C2P [14] , MAFIA, and CLIQUE [15] , which aim to divide a set of objects into clusters [15] . Nevertheless, considering the characteristics of the logs generated from large industrial DCS, the aforementioned algorithms are not applicable. Logs contain not only high-dimensional data but also data of different intricacy attribute types. For large industrial DCS, an ideal algorithm would discover the key logs that exist in subsets of the high-dimensional data and the hidden nodes that cannot be detected directly from log messages.
Generally, correlation techniques can be distinguished by three aspects. The first is temporal correlation, which is based on observations that the effects of a single fault propagate will generate multiple fault logs in a relatively short period of high probability [8] . Two main approaches to temporal correlation exist: the tupling heuristic, which gathers the logs based on the time threshold and the similarity between the log and the current tuple; and the fixed time grouping heuristic, which collects logs within a fixed time period of the first log generated. Both approaches are based on the hypothesis that the logs within a fixed time are generated by the same root cause. The crucial problem is determining an appropriate time threshold. The second is spatial correlation [16] . Spatial correlation and temporal correlation are complementary and can support each other during log analysis in a multinode system.
In multinode environments, the logs generated from different nodes at the same time can be distinguished via spatial correlation. By contrast, the logs generated from the same node at different times can be distinguished via temporal correlation. The third is content correlation, which inspects the particular contents in log messages to cluster logs. Zou et al. [7] proposed the fault keyword matrix (FK-matrix) to classify logs by calculating the probability of different words in different fault types. Pecchia et al. [17] applied lift data by comparing the degrees of association of logs with the expected value to assess statistical independence. Content correlation techniques require an appropriate metric to evaluate the degree of association, which varies across databases.
B. RELATED WORK
Various studies proposed to comprehend the meaning of logs may be useful for fault diagnosis and anomaly detection [18] . Many meaningful features have been represented by these studies. For instance, Stearley [19] proved that fault type could not be detected from logs by semantic analysis alone. In some scenarios, the position of each word is more important than the content of the log text [7] ; however, these methods are insufficient with respect to feature fusion [44] .
Several tools and methods have been designed to diagnose systems. Zhaoli et al. [1] proposed an integrated method using K-prototype and k-NN algorithms successively to perform anomaly detection, and two new distance-based features were designed to measure the anomaly degree in this clusteringfiltering-refinement framework. The results showed high detection accuracy and low computational complexity; however, the method is incapable of inferring the causality of system logs.
Xiang et al. [27] proposed an SBF method to filter out noisy error logs with fine granularity while preserving suspicious event logs likely related to the insert fault. The method is not applicable to large industrial DCSs because it requires re-execution of the fault. Wen et al. [22] proposed an observer design method of fault detection based on hyper basis function neural networks. However, this method does not offer a good indication of the fault cause.
Yuan et al. [4] proposed Sherlog to obtain the detailed process of software failures to help engineers diagnose faults. Sherlog requires neither reproduction of the failure nor semantic knowledge of the logs but assumes that the log is generated from a single machine and is hence not suitable for distributed systems. Xu et al. [6] , [20] proposed a methodology to detect problems by applying console logs without any prior knowledge from operators as input or any system instrumentation. The limitation of the technique is that it requires anomalous patterns. Hickman et al. [28] utilized the scoring and searching methods of ElasticSearch to construct their own metrics for fault diagnosis; however, the tuning parameters were not been fully explored. Bao et al. [26] proposed a universal method to detect anomalies for large-scale software systems by analyzing their console logs based on probabilistic suffix trees. Jia et al. [31] designed SmartLog to place error log statement properly by exploring the intentions of logs and mining log mechanisms with identical intentions, which can provide high-efficiency guidance for diagnosis and troubleshooting. Maikel et al. [32] proposed Statechart Workbench, a novel tool that supports users to conveniently obtain an accurate and reliable understanding of the observed software system at multiple levels of granularity. Statechart Workbench depends on example event log-based behaviors rather than aiming at a specific programming language. However, the above approaches make a common assumption that the source code of the system is available. Typically, system vendors will not provide source code to consumers for intellectual property and commercial reasons.
Many tools and systems have been proposed to track causality and moderate the burden of testing distributed systems [40] , [41] , [42] , [43] . However, such methods are incapable of analyzing events generated from multiple log sources. Francisco et al. [29] designed Falcon to coherently relate data from the various log files in a causal relationship. However, the method assumes that an event can be normalized by augmenting the information captured by a network sniffer and is hence not suitable for large industrial distributed systems, which usually have hidden nodes for which corresponding information cannot be captured.
The correlation of log data is a critical issue during the implementation of log analysis and fault diagnosis, which aims to discover the fault log sequence by tracing the key logs in the clusters and locating the root cause faults of the final event. Clearly, the fault log sequence is generated by root cause faults. Temporal and spatial correlation techniques have been applied in a variety of large-scale computing systems [23] to enhance the correlation analysis. The application of a tuple with a fixed time window is the current trend; however, the time window used in temporal correlation analysis varies under different scenarios.
Enlightened by the related work, we extract useful features from the log information instead of the raw logs from the system administrators' perspective, which can greatly minimize the amount of data to be analyzed. Furthermore, we propose an integrated log analysis methodology that can assist system administrators in locating faults quickly and finding the root cause of faults precisely.
III. THE NOWHERE TO HIDE METHODOLOGY A. MECHANISM OF EVENT OCCURRENCE AND DCS LOGGING
Unlike other large-scale distributed control systems, the DCS of nuclear power plants plays an important role in ensuring nuclear safety and stability. As a super monitoring and recording system, the DCS monitors and logs the statuses and actions of the components and the process systems in real time. These components and process systems are connected to the DCS. By contrast, those components and process systems that are not connected to the DCS cannot be monitored or logged. However, the root causes might be related to components or process systems that are not connected to the DCS; therefore, the logs in the DCS of a nuclear power unit reflect not only the statuses and failures of the components and process systems but also the protective actions of the DCS itself.
Shutdown and power reduction events occur mainly due to the following root causes. The first is a process system or component failure, where a process system or component is damaged or in an abnormal condition. For example, a damaged spool of a globe valve leads to the globe valve losing its original function, a globe valve that cannot be rotated to a certain position for some reason, or the liquid level of the process system exceeding limitations. The second is human error, which is caused by the operator violating the operating procedures. For instance, the operating procedure requires a valve to be opened, but the operator closes the valve. The third is operating procedure error. In general, the operating procedure is the guiding document of the operator and must be strictly implemented. Therefore, when the operating procedure itself has errors, it will lead to misoperation, even though the operator has not violated the operating procedure. In summary, the analysis points to the process system and components, so the failure or misoperation of a specific process systems or component would be the root cause of a shutdown or power reduction event. The challenge is how to identify the process system or component and determine the root cause. Figure 1 illustrates how an event occurs. The root cause on the left might be the fault(s) of process system(s) and/or component(s). In nuclear power unit process system operation, faults propagate through various layers of the process system, possibly generating subsequent fault(s). With sustained fault propagation, when crucial fault(s) are generated (a crucial fault means a critical limit, such as the pressure or pressure difference, temperature or temperature difference, or liquid level, is exceeded), protective action will automatically execute according to the operation mechanism of the DCS or the operator will manually place the nuclear power unit into a certain state according to operation principals. In either case, the consequence is the occurrence of an event. A fault means that a process system or component (such as a valve, pump, switch, oil system, etc.) is damaged or in an abnormal condition. An event is the final consequence of fault(s) propagation, which represents the state of the nuclear power unit, such as power reduction, reactor trip or turbine trip. In addition, during the fault(s) propagation process, the DCS might execute protective actions according to its operation mechanism. The difference is that these actions will not lead to an event directly.
For instance, as illustrated in Figure 2 , we assume that there is a misoperation on hand valve A, which increases the opening degree of valve A. Then, the flow rate of the medium increases. The transducer transmits pressure data to the DCS. Once the pressure exceeds the limit, the DCS will open the electrically operated valve B to relieve pressure by sending a protective signal. The administrators in the master control room receive the information in real time, and the electrically operated valve B can be opened by the administrators by sending the corresponding instruction to DCS. The information above will be logged in real time by the DCS, except the information of hand valve B, as it is an undetectable node. The log collection module will collect this log information from the DCS. Figure 3 shows the logging mechanism of the DCS. In the left imaginary line rectangle is the not-logged part, for which the administrators cannot know what has happened based on log information. As the process systems and components in this part are not connected to the DCS, they cannot be detected and logged by the DCS. The right solid line rectangle is the logged part, and the process systems and components in this part are connected to the DCS, which can detect and log their detailed information, such as the logging time, status and value. Therefore, the administrators will know what has occurred based on the logs. The protective actions executed by the DCS will also be logged by the DCS itself. Interactions between the undetectable and detectable process systems and components are constantly occurring; thus, if the root cause of a shutdown or power reduction event occurs in the left imaginary line rectangle, the system administrators cannot identify the root cause by checking the logs. 
B. OVERVIEW OF THE NOWHERE TO HIDE METHODOLOGY
The NTH methodology is a log analysis and fault diagnosis approach that gathers log messages from the DCS and diagnoses the root causes of shutdown or power reduction events. NTH can help system administrators understand what has happened to a nuclear power unit system and how it happened by combining fault correlation analysis with the topology and logic of the nuclear power unit process system. In our approach, we define each component and subprocess system as a node in the nuclear power unit process system, and we can obtain a topological graph of the whole nuclear power unit process system.
As shown in Figure 4 , four modules are applied to implement the procedure: the log collection module, the fault log analysis module, the fault log correlation analysis module, and the database.
The log collection module collects logs recorded in the DCS that are generated from every detectable node using an appropriately sized time window and stores all the logs in the database according to three segments: the first is detectable target nodes (DTNs), the second is detectable nontarget nodes (DNNs), and the third is DCS protective signals. Notably, the information of hidden target nodes (HTN) and hidden nontarget nodes (HNN) cannot be collected. According to the operating mechanism of the nuclear power unit and the experience of the system administrator, a shutdown or power reduction event typically occurs approximately 10 minutes after a root cause. Therefore, the time window is conservatively chosen as 15 minutes.
The database also stores a topological graph of the whole nuclear power unit process system and the logic of the nuclear power process system.
The fault log analysis module analyzes the source, structure and severity of the logs stored in the database and then restructures the log format and filters the futile log information. Moreover, the module determines the final key event log (the key log), which is taken as input for the fault log correlation analysis module. The fault log correlation analysis module combines the logic and topological graph of the nuclear power unit process system and administrator's knowledge with both the temporal and spatial correlation to determine the fault log sequence and the root cause.
As illustrated in Figure 5 , the approach starts with the analysis of fault logs, with the goal of preprocessing the raw logs that will be stored in the database and obtaining the final event log (the key log). Then, we obtain detailed information of the key log, such as the ID-Code, logging time, etc. The ID-Code represents an exact position in the nuclear power unit. By mapping the key log onto the topological graph, we can obtain the key node. As the ID-Code and node have a oneto-one correspondence, the node represents the position in the log. After clustering the nodes that are directly connected with the key node, these nodes can easily be mapped to the log message to obtain a log cluster. There may be some nodes that cannot be mapped. The logs recorded within a fixed time before the key log will also be clustered through temporal correlation, and another log cluster will be acquired. By applying the logic of the nuclear power unit process system to the above two log clusters and the mapping of failed nodes, the logs or nodes that caused the final event log (the key log) directly can be identified as key logs or HTNs. The administrator then determines whether these key logs or HTNs are the root cause. If not, these key logs or HTNs are referred to as the following key logs or key nodes (HTNs). The above procedure is repeated until the root cause of the shutdown or power reduction event is identified. The result is presented as a fault log sequence and hidden target node(s) with a causal relationship ordered by the time of occurrence.
C. FAULT LOG ANALYSIS
The purpose of the fault log analysis module is to determine which logs and which part of the log are beneficial for fault diagnosis. The manual analysis process is as follows. The first thing an administrator should do is find the final event log (key log), which is contained in the logs that have already been collected. The second step is to read the logs line by line to find the logs that have generated the key log. Then, the administrator takes the log severity level and content into account in combination with the logic of the process system while ignoring futile logs and redundant parts of the logs. Clearly, domain knowledge is indispensable in this process. The above two steps are then repeated until the suspected root cause(s) is(are) found. The last step is to verify the result, which requires an onsite assessment. Specifically, the analysis result must be correct, and the root cause(s) must be fixed; otherwise, the nuclear power unit will not be able to return to normal operation, which will lead to serious consequences, not only economic losses.
On the basis of this manual analysis process, fault diagnosis is much easier to execute if we can filter the futile logs and standardize the log format by ignoring the redundant part in advance. Therefore, we propose a fault log filter method based on a sufficient study of the log information.
The log filter method has four steps that are used to gradually analyze the log information, remove redundant messages and acquire standard log information. The steps are as follows:
Step 1: log source analysis
Step 2: log structure analysis VOLUME 7, 2019 Step 3: log severity analysis
Step 4: log filtering and standardization The steps can be divided into two main processes: step 1 to step 3, which aim to identify the redundant content by studying the logs; and step 4, which aims to acquire filtered and standardized log information to store in the database for fault log correlation analysis.
The raw log information obtained by the log collection module is the input of the algorithm. We assume that L = (l 1 , l 2 , . . . , l m ) represents the raw log information for m logs, and l i = (A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A n ) represents a log defined by n attributes, in which there are n b numeric attributes and n c textual attributes, with n b + n c = n. The standardized log information and the final event log are the output. We assume that L p = (l 1 , l 2 , . . . , l q ) represents the processed log information with q logs (q < m), and l s = (A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A r ) represents a standardized log defined by r attributes, in which there are r b numeric attributes and r c textual attributes, with r b + r c = r(r < n). K l is assumed to be the final key log. The rules in our algorithm appear as redundant attributes of the log message (output at step 2). The other is the fault log severity alphabet (output at step 3). More details of each step of the algorithm are provided in the following subsections.
1) LOG SOURCE ANALYSIS
As described previously, there are three main sources of logs: components, process systems, and DCS protective actions.
The components and process systems that might generate logs are detectable nodes; otherwise, there would not be any logs. Thus, the sources of the logs can be divided into two categories: detectable nodes and DCS protective actions. A detectable node consists of two components: DTNs and DNNs. A DTN is a node that is beneficial for fault diagnosis, whereas a DNN is a node that is useless for fault diagnosis. A DCS protective action is an action executed by the DCS automatically according to its operation rules. A protective action is triggered by a start node and operates on an end node that may not be directly connected to the start node.
In addition to detectable nodes, there are also hidden nodes, which can be divided into two categories: HTNs, which are beneficial for fault diagnosis, and HNNs, which are useless for fault diagnosis. Unfortunately, for these nodes, one cannot obtain valid information from logs, which might be crucial for fault diagnosis.
2) LOG STRUCTURE ANALYSIS
The aim of log structure analysis is to determine the redundant attributes of the log information. Example logs generated in a nuclear power unit are presented in Table 1 .
The event log is typically a single-line textual message containing 8 main attributes: (1) Logging Time is the time at which the event occurs, with an accuracy of one millisecond;
(2) Log Severity Level is the priority level of the log, which reflects the importance of the log; (3) ID-Code consists of the following two conditions. First, ID-Code provides the KKS code of the process system or component that reflects the detailed position in the unit; second, ID-Code is the code of the protective action signal executed by the DCS, with which the administrator can determine the end node and the start node that caused the signal to be generated and their KKS codes; (4) FC Text is the description of the code provided by the developer of the DCS, which can be understood based on domain knowledge; (5) Status/Value is the detailed information of the logging component or process system, such as the liquid level of a system or the action of a component; (6) Quality is the real-time degree of excellence of the logging component or process system and does not exist for most logs; (7) Signal/Inst-No is the signal code of control logic diagram database; and (8) IO-No is the interface number of the signal, which does not exist for some logs.
A log with a ''#'' in front means an event is generated; a log without a ''#'' in the front means the event disappears. However, these logs cannot be removed because there might be some crucial logs generated during the period that might be caused by the log with a ''#''.
Based on experience in log-based fault diagnosis, a system administrator might believe that some attributes in the log are useless for fault diagnosis. Logging Time, Log Severity Level, ID-Code, FC Text and Status/Value are considered to be very important for fault diagnosis, whereas the other attributes are considered to be redundant and will be removed from the log messages later.
3) LOG SEVERITY ANALYSIS
Log severity is classified according to the impact on the nuclear power unit. Severity has 6 main levels, ''H'', ''A'', ''W'', ''T'', ''C'' and ''E'', and various other minor levels, such as ''P'', ''F'', ''I'', ''O'', ''S D'' and ''F D''. Level ''H'' represents a high-priority log that contains relevant fault information about the protective actions of the reactor protection system (RPS), such as station blackout (SBO), where the power of the entire station is out, which is considered to be the highest-priority event, or relevant parameters of the process system are exceeded. Due to space limitations, the other levels are not covered here.
When system administrators perform log analysis, logs with severity levels ''H'', ''A'', ''W'' and ''T'' are the main focus, and the other levels are ignored. However, it is important that the severity levels of the logs are determined correctly, which will be addressed in the evaluation section.
4) LOG FILTER AND STANDARDIZATION
To eliminate redundancy, logs with low priority severity levels are removed. As mentioned in Section 3.3.2, some attributes of log information are considered to be useless for fault diagnosis, and these attributes are separated from the useful attributes. These two process make the logs more concise and greatly shorten the analysis time. The final processed logs are then taken as the input. Take Table 1 as an example. The algorithm has retained logs with high-priority severity levels and removed useless attributes. The function of the log information filter and standardization algorithm is specified in Equation 1, which is minimized for log analysis.
where ρ (l i , S a , H a ) is processed with severity alphabet S a and reward attributes H a . Each log in L p is represented as l s = (A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A r ). Algorithm 1 shows the pseudocode of the log filtering and standardization process. Table 2 shows the results of the log filtering and standardization: two logs with severity level E in Table 1 have been removed.
D. FAULT LOG CORRELATION ANALYSIS
The faults and protective actions generated by different components and process systems and the DCS are diagnosed by the fault log correlation analysis module based on the logs. Log correlation analysis is used to identify the connections between different fault logs, specifically, the causality.
As mentioned above, all the components and subprocess systems are defined as different nodes in the nuclear power unit process system. These nodes have substantial interactions throughout the nuclear power unit. When a detectable node acts abnormally, a continuous fault log is generated, and those detectable nodes that depend on this abnormally acting node might also produce many fault logs. By contrast, the undetectable nodes cannot produce logs, regardless of whether they are acting normally. However, due to the complexity of the nuclear power unit process system, a considerable number of subsequent fault logs are generated within a certain time after the preorder fault log occurs. Determination of the root cause of the fault is a major problem for administrators. Meanwhile, the uncertain generating time of subsequent logs and undetectable node(s) are also a substantial challenges. Thus, our method starts with the final event log (key log) and applies temporal correlation, spatial correlation and logic correlation to precisely analyze the relations of fault logs and nodes to identify the fault logs and nodes that generate the final event log. These logs generate a fault log sequence that is ordered by the time of occurrence, and these nodes can help administrators determine the root cause of the final event log. More details of our method are presented in the following subsections. 
1) TEMPORAL CORRELATION ANALYSIS
Temporal correlation analysis is generally considered to be the most effective method for fault correlation analysis. Temporal correlation analysis is based on the hypothesis that the initial faults that cause subsequent faults occur within a specified timespan. Due to the complexity of the process system, subsequent logs might be generated after the specified time, which varies for different components, process systems and actions. Our method is applied in reverse chronological order starting with the final key event log (the key log). A time window is selected, and the algorithm collects every fault log generated within this time window when a fault log occurs. These logs are gathered into a cluster (called a tuple); however, two main problems occur in our scenario with this method, as shown in the following.
The first problem is the cluster error, as shown in Figure 6 , which many experts is highly dependent on the selected time window. If the time window is too short, the cluster might fail to include some relevant fault logs. By contrast, if the window is too long, the cluster might contain a large number of noisy fault logs. Therefore, an appropriately sized time window is important.
The second problem is the hidden node effect. As mentioned above, the existence of HTNs and HNNs is inescapable in the nuclear power unit process system. These hidden nodes are undetectable, so the cluster cannot obtain their log information, which might be important for fault diagnosis. The cost function of our temporal distance algorithm, which is used for clustering log information, is specified in Equation 2.
where σ (l s , K l ) is a temporal distance measure defined as:
where (Klj−lsj) T denotes the temporal distance of log object l s from the key log K l . T is the time window chosen for the algorithm in which to collect logs. Algorithm 2 shows the pseudocode for log collection. Cluster error and the hidden node effect in a nuclear power unit process system cannot be avoided when applying only temporal correlation analysis. The various components and process systems generate vast quantities of fault logs in real time, which are difficult to correlate, and the existence of hidden nodes prevents accurate analysis by the administrator. These two problems are solved in the following sections. The log cluster collected in this section is denoted C 1 and is referred to as an incomplete cluster because it might fail to include information about the hidden nodes and might contain redundant logs.
2) SPATIAL CORRELATION ANALYSIS
A topological graph of the entire nuclear power unit process system can be established by defining each component and subprocess system as a node. Each node of the topological graph has a unique characteristic-KKS Code. We implement the following process to address the two problems in temporal correlation analysis:
First, we obtain the ID-Code, logging time, etc., of the final key event log (the key log). Regardless of the source of the log, for example, component, process system or protective action, it will be deemed as a node. For a protective action, the node is the node that generates the log. We can acquire the KKS code of the node, which indicates the exact position in the topological graph of the whole nuclear power unit process system. Then, the algorithm implements log-node mapping based on the KKS code of the log and the topological graph, and we obtain the node regarded as the key node. Next, the nodes directly connected to the key node are clustered, without omitting nay nodes. Figure 7 shows how to cluster nodes.
We assume O = (o 1 , o 2 , . . . , o u ) represents all u nodes in the topological graph of the entire nuclear power unit process system, and each node has a unique characteristic-KKS code. o k represents the key node corresponding to the key log. The cost function of our spatial distance algorithm, which is used to cluster node information, is specified in Equation 4 .
ε(o w , o k ) denotes the spatial distance of log object o w from key node o k . d is the spatial distance measurement chosen for the algorithm to collect nodes.
The parameters needed by the algorithm to cluster the connected nodes are as follows. The distance between nodes that are connected directly is defined as 1, and if a node needs to pass through another node to reach the target node, the distance is defined 2, and so on. For our algorithm, we define d = 1. Algorithm 3 shows the pseudocode for node clustering. . . , o v ) represents the v nodes collected above. For node cluster O 1 , algorithm 4 implements a node-log mapping using the KKS codes of the nodes and the log information. The result of the successfully mapped nodes is gathered into a log cluster. There might be node(s) that cannot be mapped, which can be termed the hidden node(s), including both HTNs and the HNNs. The cost function of our distance algorithm, which is used for clustering log information, is specified in Equation 5 .
where τ (o w , l s ) is the matching degree of the KKS code of nodes o w to log l s, which is defined as:
Algorithm 4 shows the pseudocode for node-log mapping. The result of the spatial correlation analysis is a log cluster and a hidden node(s) cluster. The hidden node(s) cluster is denoted O h , and the log cluster collected in this section is denoted C 2 , which is also referred to as an incomplete cluster, as it might fail to include protective action logs. Furthermore, the hidden node(s) cluster O h may contain redundant nodes. The purpose of this section is to determine the log(s) or HTNs that are the direct cause of the key log by applying the VOLUME 7, 2019 Algorithm 5 Logic Correlation Determination function Logic Correlation Determine () if ((log KKS code/FC text)||(hidden node KKS code) equals (logic information KKS code/FC text)) then (collect logic information) if (log|| node cause key log) then(collect log|| node) end if end function logic of the nuclear power unit process system and components. When executing logic correlation analysis, the system administrator typically reads the logic file page by page to determine the logic correlation. Each of the thousands of subprocess systems and hundreds of thousands of components of a nuclear power unit may have a different operating mechanism, so the logic is extremely sophisticated and obscure for the administrator to remember. Therefore, we establish a database to store the intricate logic information of the nuclear power unit process system and components that will be called when performing the logic correlation analysis.
On the basis of the results of 1) and 2), a new log cluster C(C = C 1 + C 2 ) is obtained by combining the two log clusters. If the new log cluster contains two identical logs, either can be removed. Theoretically, this situation occurs only when a detectable node is directly connected to the key node and the log of the node is generated within the time window. As shown in Figure 8 , the new log cluster C and the hidden node cluster O h are taken as the input for logic correlation analysis. Our methodology scans the database using the unique KKS code(s) or FC Text of the log(s) in the new log cluster and the hidden node(s). Then, the logic information that matches the KKS code(s) or FC Text is collected to facilitate administrator analysis. Next, the log(s) and the hidden node(s) that cause the key log directly are identified based on the detailed logic information. Notably, our methodology judges the category, such as RPS command, safety-related (SR) reactor limitation system (RLS) command, non-safety (NS) protection command, NS auto command and NS manual command. Therefore, these log(s) are defined as the preorder key log(s), and the hidden node(s) are defined as HTNs.
Algorithm 5 shows the pseudocode for the logic correlation determination.
As illustrated in Figure 8 , logic correlation analysis is used to confirm the log(s) or the HTNs that cause the key log directly: HNNs are ignored. The result of algorithm 5 is used for root cause determination.
4) ROOT CAUSE DETERMINATION
The methodology presented in this section, in combination with the experience of the system administrator, is used to determine whether the output of 3) is the root cause. As empirical errors frequently occur, considering the existence of the HTNs and the existence of detectable target node(s), onsite verification is essential to root cause determination. In some scenarios, onsite verification is also of upmost importance in determining the solution. For instance, assuming that an electrically operated valve is identified as the root cause, during an onsite verification, the administrator can determine whether the valve is completely or partially damaged, as well as the extent of damage, and determine whether to replace the whole valve or just part of it.
As illustrated in Figure 4 , if the key log(s) or HTNs are defined as the root cause(s), our methodology terminates; otherwise, the key log(s) or HTNs that are identified by 3) could be determined as subsequent key logs or key nodes, and we return to 1) and 2) for further correlation analysis until the root cause(s) is(are) identified. When our methodology terminates, we obtain a fault log sequence and HTNs, and the root cause(s) and solution can be determined by the system administrator.
IV. EVALUATION OF THE NOWHERE TO HIDE METHODOLOGY
The reasons that traditional log analysis methodologies cannot be applied to nuclear power units are addressed by discussing the following questions.
Q1. Can traditional methodologies reveal the process of fault propagation in a nuclear power unit?
Many previous methodologies aim to discover abnormal behavior by distinguishing abnormal log clusters from normal log clusters, which denote individual fault types. These fault types are identified by parsing the contents of logs and measuring the distances between logs. However, these methodologies can only detect abnormal logs and not the process of fault propagation. Some methodologies are have been proposed to track the causality of logs by recording causally related performance data from an end-to-end execution path or by encoding the happens-before relationships as constraints over symbolic variables from distributed execution. However, these methodologies assume that all the required information can be captured and that the log information comprises read (receive) and write (send) segments. Because of the objective existence of hidden nodes and the inability to capture the corresponding information of these nodes in the nuclear power unit, there are no read (receive) and write (send) segments in the logs generated by the nuclear power unit. Clearly, these methodologies are impracticable.
Q2. Can traditional methodologies detect the hidden nodes in a nuclear power unit?
Traditional methodologies generally utilize logs simply as analysis objects and are incapable of detecting hidden nodes because they do not consider the existence of such nodes. Clearly, this approach is inadequate for fault diagnosis of shutdown and power reduction events in nuclear power units, and the existence of hidden nodes might lead to a loss of extremely crucial information and invalidation of the fault diagnosis. Thus, the topological graph is implemented in our methodology as a vitally important analysis object. NTH can detect hidden nodes, which might be extremely crucial to the identification of the root cause, by applying the topological graph of the nuclear power process system.
Q3. If the hidden nodes are already obtained, can traditional methodologies explore the causality of the logs and hidden nodes in nuclear power units?
Let us assume that the hidden nodes have already been obtained. When analyzing the logs, traditional methodologies apply various distance functions to detect the correlations of logs, such as temporal distance, spatial distance and content distance. However, these distance functions are incapable of exploring the causality of logs and hidden nodes due to the absence of logic correlation in nuclear power unit process systems. Therefore, NTH applies logic correlation, which is essential for correlation analysis, to explore the causality of the logs and hidden nodes in nuclear power units.
Having discussed the questions above, we are aware that traditional log analysis methodologies cannot be applied in nuclear power units.
The results of our methodology are presented as a fault log sequence with a causal relationship ordered by the time of occurrence, and the information of HTN is indispensable in some scenarios.
As shutdown and power reduction event rarely occur, we use 6 real events (4 shutdown events and 2 power reduction events) to test the main functions and evaluate the performance of the NTH methodology. Figure 9 shows compares the number of raw logs before and after filtering and standardization. Different events generate different numbers of event logs within the fixed time window (15 minutes). Figure 10 compares the size of the raw logs before and after filtering and standardization.
In Figure 11 , to better illustrate the difference, we compared the logs of the four events with logs generated in the normal state. Clearly, in the normal state, fewer logs are generated within the fixed time window (15 minutes), and the number of logs generated in each minute is much smaller. Based on the above observations, we can infer that a large quantity of logs are generated when a fault occurs. Figure 12 shows the percentage of the number and size of raw logs filtered. More than 88% of the useless logs are typically filtered, and more than 95% of the redundant log content of logs is filtered, which reduces the time required for fault diagnosis to a certain extent.
The NTH methodology assists the system administrator in understanding what has occurred in the nuclear power unit process system and how it happened by means of the fault correlation analysis and the topology and logic of the nuclear power unit process system.
The KKS code of the final key event log (the key log) represents an exact position in the nuclear power unit process system, and mapping to the topological graph can be used to identify the key node. Next, nodes are clustered with algorithm 3, and algorithm 4 implements node-log mapping. The successfully mapped nodes are gathered into a log cluster, and the node(s) that cannot be mapped are called hidden node(s), including both HTNs and the HNNs. Furthermore, the logs recorded within a fixed time interval before the key log are also clustered by algorithm 2. By applying the logic of the nuclear power unit process system to the above two clusters and the hidden nodes, the logs or nodes that directly cause the final event log (the key log) can be determined as the key logs or nodes. With the assistance of the NTH methodology and onsite verification, the administrator can identify the root cause of the shutdown or power reduction event.
For a nuclear power unit, the time cost of accurate fault diagnosis for shutdown and power reduction events is crucial. The engineers of the nuclear power unit are the users of the methodology, and the time cost of the method is compared to that of a professional senior engineer performing fault diagnosis. We choose three engineers with different working experience and qualifications to evaluate the time cost of our methodology: an assistant engineer for 3 years, an engineer for 5 years and an engineer for 7 years. Figure 13 shows the time cost comparison of three engineers with the assistance of the NTH methodology. Despite the assistance of the methodology, the performance of the 3-year assistant engineer is the worst. Normally, a 3-year assistant engineer is still in the learning stage and will not participate in fault diagnosis. The performance of the 5-year engineer is close to that of the professional senior engineer and is even better for event 1 and event 4. The 7-year engineer achieves the best performance with the assistance of the methodology.
The results of our experiment show that the methodology can assist a 5-year engineer to approach the performance of a professional senior engineer and assist a 7-year engineer to surpass the performance of a professional senior engineer. These results demonstrate the high efficiency and low time complexity in assisting administrators in locating faults and determining the root cause of shutdown and power reduction events. Moreover, the results highlight the importance of the working experience and qualifications of administrators for fault diagnosis. These factors are related to the degree of familiarity with the domain knowledge of the DCS in the nuclear power unit. The NTH methodology produces a fault log sequence with causal relationships ordered by the time of occurrence, and the information of HTN is also indispensable in some scenarios.
For instance, the results when administrators analyze the logs of event 5 by applying the NTH methodology are shown in Table 3 .
The results show the detailed process of event 5. The misoperation of the oil draining valve (KKS code: 2MAX30AA502) is easily identified as the root cause. There are 26 lines in the log, only 3 lines have a severity level of A or T, and the remaining lines have a low severity level of E. However, some of these lines are extremely important for fault diagnosis. Thus, the answer to the question in Section 3 is no. Therefore, the severity levels of these lines of the log should be increased. Furthermore, the manual oil draining valve is undetectable as an HTN. However, information about HTNs is crucial for determining root causes. Therefore, these HTNs should be made detectable by adding detectors. Thus, a position indicator is added to the oil draining valve. The administrator also discovers that some crucial logs are generated directly; thus, forewarning logs can be added before these crucial logs to remind the administrator.
V. THREATS TO VALIDITY
We discuss the validity of the NTH methodology and the results as follows.
Technical transformations are frequently implemented to improve the operation capacity and efficiency of nuclear power units, which leads to changes in the structure and characteristics of the components and process system. For example, the spatial distance between the parts and the process system might be changed, and previously undetectable nodes may become detectable. If this information is not updated in time, the correlation analysis of our methodology will fail.
Another issue concerns the type of nuclear power unit. The data for the 6 event logs were collected from a specific type of nuclear power unit. However, different types of nuclear power units generate different logs, and the operation mechanism might be completely different. Therefore, the NTH methodology should be revised and adapted to other types of nuclear power units.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
With the rapid development of large nuclear power DCS, the integrated architectures of process systems and components are becoming increasingly complicated. The frequent interactions between diverse process systems and components make their logic correlation difficult to understand. Considering the existence of undetectable components in the nuclear power process system, the difficulty of log-based fault diagnosis is also increased. To address these issues, we propose the NTH methodology for fault diagnosis via the analysis of fault logs to assists administrators in analyzing logs generated by all the detectable components of nuclear power process systems, diagnosing faults and determining root causes when shutdown and power reduction events occur.
We propose a new method to filter and standardize the logs according to their characteristics to effectively perform log analysis. We use log-node and node-log mapping to collect fault logs and hidden nodes to optimize the analytical range and accelerate the fault tracing speed. In addition, we improve the fault log correlation analysis. We also use the logic of the nuclear power unit process system to reinforce the correlation analysis, thereby avoiding the cluster error and hidden node effect. We find that, at least for now, a methodology that combines humans and computers might be the most effective method for fault diagnosis of shutdown and power reduction events in nuclear power units.
Future work will consider two main aspects. First, we will collect more fault logs generated by different types of shutdown and power reduction events from a nuclear power unit simulator system to achieve better performance via machine leaning technology and to minimize manual involvement in fault diagnosis. Second, we will enhance the fault log correlation analysis to achieve fast and accurate failure prediction, which will help system administrators to efficiently identify and fix shutdown and power reduction events. 
